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RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATION LAW
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES.
By GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER, Esq.
II. RIGHTS OF STOCKHOLDERS AND CREDITORS IN THE PROP-
ERTY OF THE CORPORATION.
In the May Number of the AM;ERICAN LAW REGISTER AND
REVIEWl an attempt was made by the writer to state the
result of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon the subject of Corporate Power. The
decision in Central Transportation Company v. Pullman's
Palace Car Company 2 was examined, and attention was
called to certain difficulties in the way of harmonizing some
of the views expressed in that case with other decisions by the
same Court. It is now proposed to give some considera-
tion to the problems which, in constantly increasing num-
bers, are being presented to the Court for solution in cases
concerning the rights of stockholders and creditors of insol-
vent corporations.
The ears of the American lawyer have grown accustomed
to the assertion that the capital stock of a corporation is a trust
fund for the payment of debts. He has heard this trust fund
doctrine referred to with pride as an American doctrine and
there are not wanting those who find in this circumstance a
stimulus to patriotic sentiment and a reason for self-congratu-
lation.3  There seems to be something in the thought of a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors which arouses within the
lawyer's breast a feeling of legal chivalry; and more than one
distinguished judge has become a knight-errant in the service
1 34 AM. L. REG., page 296.
2 139 U. S. 24.
3 E.g., Judge SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON : 27 Am. Law. Rev. 846. Judge
THOMPSON to some extent modifies his expressions upon this subject in
2953 el. seq. of his recently published Commentaries on Corporation Law.
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of this honored doctrine-although in so doing he has laid
himself open to the imputation on the part of less sentimental
jurists of engaging in a somewhat Quixotic tilt at legal wind-
mills. In the pages of this magazine4 comments have
appeared from time to time upon some of the more notablL
decisions which purport to be based upon the trust fund doc-
trine; and in the pages of the American Law Review, Mr.
Thacher5 of New York and the late Mr. McMurtrie ' of Phila-
delphia have contributed valuable suggestions to the discussion
of the general subject.
Whatever this trust fund doctrine may be, it is at any rate
certain that the Supreme Court of the United States is defi-
nitely committed to it. In Handley v. Stutzj Mr, Justice
BROW N uses the following language :-4' "er since the case of
Sawer v. traag, 17 Wall. 6Io, it has i the settled doctrine
of this court that the capital stock of _ insolvent corporation
is a trust fund for the payment of its debts; that the law
implies a promise by the original subscribers of stock who did
not pay for it in money or other property to pay for the same
when called upon by creditors; and that a contract between
themselves and the corporation, that the stock shall be treated
as fully paid and non-assessable, or otherwise limiting their
liability therefor, is void as against creditors. The decisions
of this court upon this subject have been frequent and uniform,
and no relaxation of the general principle has been admitted,
Upton v. Thibilcock, 91 U.- S. 45 ; Sat'gr v, Upton1, 91 U, S.
56 ;. Webster v. Upton, 9I U. S. 65; chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S.
665; Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328; County of Moran v,
Allen, 103 U. S. 498 ; Hazwkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S.'319;
Graham v. Railroad CO., 102 U. S. 148, I61 ; Richardson v.
Green, 134 U. S. 30." In a case decided the same year 8 Mr.
Justice HARLAN said :-" In Sawyer v. oag, I7 Wall. 6ro,
620, it was held that the capital stock of a corporation, especi-
ally its unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund sub modo for the
4E. g., 32 Am. LAw Rn1c. & Rnv., t75.
S25 AM. Law Rev., 940.
6 25 Am. Law Rev., 749.
139 U. S. 417. (1891).
S Clar/k v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96. (1S9 1.)
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benefit of its general creditors . . . . There is no dispute here
as to thd soundness of this general principle." In Fogg v.
Biair, decided upon the same day as the preceding case, the
same learned justice says, " It is the settled doctrine of this
Court . . . . that unpaid subscriptions to the stock of a cor-
poration constitute a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors
which may not be given away or disposed of by it, without
consideration or fraudulently, to the prejudice of such credi-
tors."
In Camden v. Stuart, o Mr. Justice BROWN reasserts the
Court's adherence to the doctrine and says " Nothing that was
said in the recent cases of Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96; Fogg
v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118; or Hand/ey v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417,
was intended to overrule or qualify in any way the wholesome
principle adopted by this court in the earlier cases, etc., etc."
In Potts v. Wallace,"1 Mr. Justice SHIRAS reviews the cases and
finds that the law of Pennsylvania is in accord with Federal
doctrine upon this point and remarks " It is undoubtedly true
that in Pennsylvania in the case of an insolvent corporation,
its assets including unpaid capital stock constitute a trust
fund." In the same year, in Swan Land and Cattle Co. v.
Frank, 12 the Court per Mr. Justice JACKSON, gives its assent to
the theory that the assets of the corporation "constitute a
trustfund for the payment of all debts and demands." If any
modification of the statement made above is required, it is as
the result of the more guarded assertion of Mr. Justice BREWER
in fHol/ins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 13 where the learned
judge says :-" While it is true language has been frequently
used to the effect that the assets of a corporation are a trust
fund held by a corporation for the benefit of creditors, this has
not been to convey the idea that there is a direct and express
trust attached to the property. As said in 2 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, lO46, they" are not in any true and complete
sense trusts, and can only be called so by way of analogy or
9 139 U. S. 1t8.
0 144 U. S. 104. (18gi.)
11 146 U. S. 618. (1892.)
12 148 U. S. 6o3. (1892.)
13 150 U. S. 371. (1893.)
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-metaphor." The Profession has not had an opportunity to
• sertain whethcr or not this suggestion that in dealing with
the trust fund doctrine we are living in the domain of meta-
phor and hyperbole is to be adhered to by the court; for
neither in 151, 152, 153, 154, 155 nor 156 V. S. are problems
of this character presented to the judges for decision. Accord-
ingly, in the absence of a' definite repudiation of the trust fund
doctrine, whatever that may be, it seems upon the whole to be
justifiable to assert that tlie Supreme Court is committed to it,
In view of these considerations, it is a matter of no little
interest to ascertain just what the trust fund doctrine is, and to
determine what the commercial conditions are which seem to
have driven the Supreme Court to declare its adherence to a
metaphor as a rule of judicial decision.
There are at least three possible views of the true nature of
the property of a corporation and of the consequent rights and
liabilities of stockholders and creditors. In the first place, the
,courts might 'Unite in holding that the corporation "is entitled
to hold property (if not contrary to its'charter) as absolutely
as an individual can hold it," and that "its estate is the same,
its interest is the same, its possession of the same," 1 If this
view were to prevail, the corporation might deal with its prop-
erty as an individual may do and might dispose of its property
subject only to the limitations which obtain in the case of an in-
dividual with respect to the rights of creditors. If balances on
stock remained unpaid and the corporation had in no way cut
itself off from collecting those balances, creditors might reach
them on the ground-and only upon the ground-that they
were the property of the corporation in the same way that
• bills receivable" are assets of a firm. A creditor's bill would
be a mere equitable execution or a means of garnishment
available for the creditor who had reduced his claim to judg-
ment at law. The corporation could unquestionably prefer a
creditor as an individual may do and it would make no differ-
•ence whether the creditor happened- to be a stranger to the
corporation, a stockholder therein or a director thereof. If
.the stockholder whose balance was unpaid was also a creditor
14
Air. Justice BRADIBY in Graham v, R. R. r02 U. S. 148. (188o.)
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of the corporation on another transaction, he could set-off his
claim against the stock debt when called upon to pay either
by the corporation or a creditor claiming through it. In
short, there would be no such thing as a department of cor-
poration law concerned with the rights of corporate creditors
in the property of their debtor, for they would stand before the
law in the same position as if they were seeking to enforce
their rights against a natural person with no ground for ask-
ing for the application of equitable principles unless there was
present in the case some such well-recognized basis of equit-
able relief as fraud upon creditors or a state of affairs calling
for marshalling of assets, subrogation or the like. In this view
of the case it would on principle be immaterial whether or not
a contract to pay less than par for stock is regarded as a valid
contract. If the courts regard it as valid, no difficulty would
arise. If they treated it as impolitic and invalid, a right of
rescission would exist in favor of the corporation. There
would be either the contract which the parties made or none
at all.
"In the next place, the courts might agree in treating the
property of a corporation as being, so to speak, the product
of representations made by each and all of the stockholders
to the public to the effect that for each share of stock one
-hundred per cent. of value had actually been paid into the
treasury or had been conveyed to the corporation as property,
or subsisted in the hands of the stockholder ready to be paid
in upon demand. On this view, the rights of creditors would
be both greater and less than upon the basis of the doctrine
suggested above. A contract made in good faith betveen a
stockholder and the corporation with terms different from
those above outlined would not be enforced according to its
terms against a creditor; for the latter would be entitled to
invoke the doctrine of estoppel for the purpose of subjecting
a stockholder to a liability of one hundred per cent. on the
dollar, no matter what his actual agreement with the corpora-
tion might have been. -In otheiwords, this view involves the
proposition of substantive law that a contract by which one
becomes the owner of stock is necessarily and inevitably an
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undertaking upon the part of the stockholder to pay par and
a representation to the public that if the par of the stock has
not already been paid, the holder will pay it on demand. It
would therefore be true, in a sense, that the courts in such a
case would not be making a subscriber live up to a bargain
entered into by him, but would be making a bargain for him
and compelling him to live up to that. 5 On the other hand,
as said above, the rights of creditors would be to some extent
less upon this view. As the basis of the creditor's right is
estoppel, it should seem that only those creditors would be
entitled to compel payment of par value who become such
after the occurrence of the transaction complained of and who
give credit in ignorance of the real facts of the case. If the
first view were to obtain, it should seem that prior creditors
would be entitled to the same relief as subsequent creditors,
the basis of their equity being in each case fraud. Nothing
in this view of the nature of the creditor's right is inconsistent
with the exercise by the corporation of the right of a natural
person to set-off, in case of mutual debts, or of the right to
prefer a creditor in case of insolvency.
A third possible view would be the view that the corpora-
tion is identical with the members that compose it and that it
and they hold the corporate property in trust for the benefit
of corporate creditors. This view, it will be observed, is en-
tirely distinct from the doctrine based on estoppel and adverted
to above. Thetheoryofa trust for creditors necessarilyinvolves
the protection of prior and subsequent creditors alike: for
otherwise we should have the anomaly of an equitable doctrine
existing for the benefit of a class which conceivably might
never come into existence to the exclusion of those whose
meritorious claims had already accrued. Again, on any
known definition of a trust we must have a specific res or sub-
ject matter, the legal title to which is in the trustee. In the
case of a bona fide contract between corporation and stock-
holder that stock shall be treated as full paid when 50 per
cent. only has been paid in fact, it is to be observed that no
15 See the language of Mr. Justice BRowN (then District Judge) in
Flim v. Bagley, 7 Fed. Rep. 785. (181.)
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mere trust theory will enable a creditor to reach the unpaid
50 per cent. This follows from the fact that the limitation
expressed in the contract is valid between the corporation and
the stockholder,-which means that the corporation not only
has no legal title to the property represented by the unpaid
balance but can never acquire it. We should accordingly
have the spectacle of a trustee without right or title to the
trust property. On the other hand, no right of preference
would exist; for if there is not enough to satisfy all cestuis
que trustent in full, equality is equity and the trustee must
settle with all pro rata. It should seem, however, that a right
to set-off would exist in favor of a stockholder-creditor, even
upon the trust theory: for in no intelligible sense can one indi-
vidual stockholder be a trustee for those who are creditors of
the corporation-that is (on this view) of the stockholders treat-
ed in the aggregate; and as far as an individual stockholder
is concerned, it is the case of a claim against him and a claim
in his favor. It should seem to be immaterial that the claim
against him is a claim for the delivery to the corporation of
trust property subsisting in his hands. If his obligation is
merely to pay trust property to the trustee, and if at the same
time the trust fund is liable for the satisfaction of a bona fide
claim in his favor, why deny the applicability of the doctrine
of set-off?
It is believed that these are the only three theories which,.
upon general legal principles, can be applied to the relations
subsisting between the creditors of a corporation, the corpora--
tion itself, and its stockholders. It is nevertheless certain that.
no one of these theories corresponds to the so-called "trust
fund doctrine" as recognized in the decisions of the Supreme.
Court of the United States. This becomes clear if we but,
glance at the cases already cited and at others which are
inseparably connected with them. The Court, it should seem,.
would recognize the right of an insolvent corporation to prefer
a creditor." This is inconsistent with the theory of a trust.
1y
16 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co. (150 U. S. 371. 1893) taken
in connection with
U Emerson v. Lester, 118 U. S. 3. (i885.) See 2 N. W. LawRev. 173..
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The court permits a creditor to collect from a stockholder a
balance unpaid on his subscription in spite of a contract
between the stockholder and the corporation that nothing
more shall be deemed due thereon. 8 This also is inconsistent
with the theory of a trust. The court will not permit a credi-
tor t6 file a bill to have the trust property applied to the satis-
faction of his claim unless he has first obtained a judgment at
law." Here again is a result inconsistent with- the theory that
a trust exists for the benefit of creditors. The court compels
a stockholder who has received a distribution of stock by way
of gratuity to respond for the par value thereof, and that, too,
only in favor of subsequent creditors; but in the same case
refuses to reach a similar result with respect to the recipients
of a stock bonus issued as an inducement to subscribe for the
bondsofa "going concern " which had run into debt." This
result is inconsistent with the doctrine of estoppel as is also the
decision long ago rendered in Sawyer v. Hoag," and reiterated
in Handley v. Stuzd, (snpra) that no set-off will be permitted in
favor of a stockholder-creditor.
The refusal of set-off and the ignoring of the contract
between stockholder and corporation when the rights of a
creditor intervene are inconsistent with the property theory,
Upon the property theory the liability of the stockholder
would be a simple debt and might well be the subject of set-
off; while in a case where the corporation has no contract
rights against a stockholder, as far as that stockholder is con-
cerned, the corporation has no property which a creditor can
reach.
The result of our inquiry is to establish that the so-called
Trust Fund Doctrine is a thing different from any one of these
three theories-and they, we believe, represent the only possi-
ble ways in which general legal principles can be applied to
corporate phenomena. If the question of the further develop-
ment of a legal doctrine was to be settled upon the basis of
Is Hawley v. Upton, 102 U. S. 314. (i880.)
19 H ollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., rso U. S. 37r. (1893.)
0 Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417. (1891.)
21 17 Wall. 6ro. (1873.)
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pure legal reasoning, these considerations would compel us to
abandon further discussion of the "Trust Fund" and to cast
aside every thing but the simple property theory since, upon
principle, it is the only one to which courts should give their
assent. The estoppel theory involves a serious piece of judi-
cial legislation as to what the effect of a contract shall be.
This alone is enough to condemn it. The trust theory is,
strictly speaking, untenable. It involves a conception which
(in the language of Mr. Justice BRADLEY) 1 "is at war with the
notions which we derive from the English law with regard to
the nature of corporate bodies." Followed to its logical con-
clusion, it would lead to results which could not be tolerated.'
In the judgment of the writer, however, the development of
the law upon this subject is not to be settled upon the basis of
pure legal reasoning and a consideration of the -true nature of
the Trust Fund Theory or Doctrine seems to make this plain.
If it is permissible to answer the question as to the nature of
this theory or doctrine by way of paradox, the answer is that
it, is neither a theory nor a doctrine. The name "Trust
Fund" is a name given by American courts and American
- riters to the more or less systematic judicial recognition of a
demand of the commercial world. That demand is, in sub-
stance, that the liability of a stockholder shall be unlimited
up to the par value of his shares and that he shall not be
entitled to the benefit of any legal principle which would
normally entitle him to an advantage against corporate credi-
tors. This is not a legal theory. It is a commercial condi-
tion struggling for recognition in the courts. If this fact had
been perceived in the first instance, courts probably would
never have undertaken the task of doing the legislature's
work. But perceiving dimly the commercial necessity and
charmed by the indefinite possibilities suggested by the word
"trust," they entered upon the field and they have never
been willing to quit it. Any criticism of the cases on this
subject which ignores this fact seems to the writer to be per-
verse and unintelligent. The courts have been doing legisla-
22 Graham v. R. R., 102 U. S. 148. (I88o.)
23Hollins v. Brierfield Co., 1,50 U. S. 371. (1893).
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tive work. They have reached their decisions upon the basis
of practical necessity and they have called in sometimes
one legal theory and sometimes another in an attempt to give
the result a juristic aspect, Can anyone who reads the decis-
ions of the Supreme Court of the United States doubt that
this is the true explanation of their course ? In order to make
good this point, it is only necessary to refer to the language of
Mr. Justice MILLER in regard to set-off in Sawyer v. Hoag,
(szpra) to the opinion of Mr. Justice HARLAN in Clark v. Bever, 2"
and to that of Mr. Justice BROWN in Handley v. Stutz.2 The
judges even talk about being "embarrassed" by previous
decisions when they desire to reach a certain result. If that
result can be best attained by invoking the theory of a trust,
then the courts without hesitation adopt the trust theory for
the purpose of that case. When it is attempted to make a trust
decision the basis of an inductive argument, as in the case
of Hollins v. Brierfield Co., (supra), the court does not shrink
from declaring that the use of the term trust in the earlier
cases was metaphorical. If the doctrine of estoppel will
enable the courts to accomplish an obviously just result, then
the doctrine of estoppel is more or less distinctly enunciated.
It by no means follows, however, that the doctrine of estoppel
is to be applied in the next case whidh arises or even in a
different branch of the same case. In Handley v. Stutz,
(supra) the court affects to perform the impossible task of
distinguishing on principle between the status of two sets of
stockholders ; and holds one set liable and declares that the
other set is entitled to immunity. Mr. Chief Justice FULLER
and Mr. Justice LAMAR dissented. They were unable to see
the distinction. There was no distinction in law bbt there
seemed to be an exigency in fact which called for a distinction
in result. Thus Mr. Justice HARLAN, in Clark v. Bever,
(suipra) uses the following language in support of the conclu-
sion that a stockholder is not liable to a subsequent creditor
for the par value of stock which had been disposed of at its
actual value which was less than par-and he uses it with all
21 139 U. S. 96. (r891.)
25 139 U. S. 417 (i891).
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the confidence which we are accustomed to associate with the
enunciation of a principal of law:-"To say that a public cor-
poration, charged with public duties, may not relieve itself
from embarrassment by paying its debt in stock at its real
value-there being no statute forbidding such a transaction-
without subjecting the creditor, surrendering his debt, to the
liability attaching to stockholders who have agreed, expressly
or impliedly, to pay the face value of stock subscribed by
them, is, in effect, to compel them either to suspend operations
the moment they become unable to pay their current debts, or
to borrow money secured by mortgage upon the corporate
property." He follows this up immediately by a general pro-
testation to the effect that the court is not to be understood as
imodifying " the principles laid down in the cases above cited."
The same line of thought characterizes the opinion of the
same learned Justice in Fogg v. Blair.6 When the facts of
the case require that stockholders should be held for the
unpaid balance (as in Camden v. Stuart, supra) it becomes
necessary to reassure the Profession that the earlier cases of
Handley v. Stutz, Clark v. B ever and Fogg v. Blair are not to
be regarded as having established a principle of immunity in
favor of the stockholder.
If this view of the ease is correct it seems too clear for argu-
ment that the mass of decisions is so great that a return to
first legal principles is an impossibility. The only practical
question is that which relates to the means of perfecting the
work of judicial legislation which is at present in an unfinished
condition. That it is in an unfinished condition scarcely ad-
mits of dispute. The impossibility of predicting the view
which the court will take of a given commercial condition is
admirably brought out by Mr. Edward Avery Harriman in
some recent papers in the Northwestern Law Review.-" He
exposes the fallacy underlying the attempt of Judge SEYMOUR
D. THOMPSON to overthrow upon principle the doctrine that
:Z 139 U. S. 1I8. (1891.)
• Vol. II, No. 6, page 167, "The Power of Corporations to prefer Credi-
tors;" Vol. III, No. 4, page 115, "Corporate Assets as a 'Trust Fund
for the benefit of Creditors; ' " Vol. III, No. 7, page 206, " Corporate
Assets as a 'Trust Fund for the benefit of Creditors. ' I
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an insolvent corporation can prefer its creditors. He also
demonstrates that upon p-incple a right of preference exists as
well in the case where the preferred creditor is a director as
where he is a stockholder of -the preferring corporation; and
he aptly criticises the decision of Mr. Justice HARLAN in the
Circuit Court of Appeals in .ljfg. Co. v. Hutchinson,2 as being
inconsistent, upon principle, with the decision in Hollins v.
Brierfield Co. which the learned Justice cites in support of
his conclusion. No one who has had practical experience in
the work of organizing or re-organizing a corporation will
deny that there are serious difficulties and embarrasments to
be encountered at every turn.
Is not the solution of the difficulty that which was suggested
above? The courts have begun a work of judicial legislation
and they have undertaken to develop a new status-hitherto
but little defined by the law-the status of a "stockholder."
It remains to recognize frankly that this is the truth of the
matter and to decide boldly that the contract of membership
in a corporation has, as an inseparable incident to it, the obli-
gation to pay into the corporate treasury the par value, in
money or property, of the stock of a new concern and the
actual value, if less than par, of the stock of a "going con-
cern; " and that the making of a contract of membership in-
volves a waiver by the stockholder of the right to enforce any
principle of law which would result in relieving him from his
absolute liability actually to pay the amount thus determined
into the coffers of the corporation. By becoming a stock-
holder he has waived his right to a set-off-no matter how
clear that right may be. He has waived his right to a prefer-
ence no matter how obvious it is that in the absence of waiver
he would be entitled to it. He has undertaken to contribute
a given amount for the benefit of creditors and he has agreed
that he will remain passive until their claims are satisfied. It
is believed that this is the result which the commercial world
demands; and to obtain it nothing is needed but a frank
avowal of the situation by the Court, coupled with an author-
ative announcement of the suggested rule of law.
28 63 Fed. Rep. 496.
